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DISCUSSION AFTER THE SPEECH OF RICHARD
CUNNINGHAM
QUESTION, PROFESSOR KING: You raised a lot of questions,
and I want to raise some questions with you. You are not going to get
away with this. One, you said the political dynamic on environmental
and labor was different on those issues. My first question is, is there
any way of dealing with that dynamic, or does it just exist without any
solution?
My second question is, the NAFTA covers investment issues and
gives remedies in cases like that. Do you just dismiss the fact that the
multilateral approach can cover investment issues?
ANSWER, MR. CUNNINGHAM: Let me deal with the second
question first. I did not mean to imply the multilateral approach cannot
cover investments, What I do mean to say is that, in the regional context, investment issues become more immediate and they become more
amenable to making the process by bargaining. The countries seeking
access to investment have more to trade for it, and they have more
leverage to get open investment in a regional context than they do in an
isolated multilateral investment-only discussion.
My experience has been that investment issues are difficult for developing countries. These are issues in which the developing country
very much needs to get something in order to open up the investment
possibility. Were I structuring a negotiation issue of the United States
law, I would focus it more on regionalism than on the multilateral basis,
and I would try to create a dynamic in which the rules on a multilateral
basis flow out of what you achieved on a regional basis.
As to your second question, I think, first of all, it is important to
avoid posing the environmental trade conflict in a specific context. I
think the United States found out in the tuna/dolphin thing that you can
get yourself in lots of trouble doing that. And you end up with the
environmentalists hating you or the world trade system hating you. The
key to that is to try to find a way to give the environmentalists some
satisfaction without using a trade remedy or a trade restriction.
The more difficult question is what to do about the effort of environmental groups to make the environment a rider, as an enforceable
element that has to be part of the overall agreement in the one up, one
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down Fast Track vote in a regional or even bilateral trade agreement.
It seems to me there are two types of things that you can do about
that. I do not believe that you have a good prospect for success by
advocating separate agreements on this, and that should satisfy the environmental community as a whole. If that is the approach that you are
going to take, and I believe it is the approach the Administration is
trying to take now, the only way to get that would be to cultivate a
substantial portion of the environmental community to support that view.
But, there are differences within the environmental community on these
issues, so in order to get such a substantial portion of the environmental
community supporting that view, you would have to politically roll over
the global environmentalists in the Congress.
That is what they are trying to do. Maybe it will work. But, it will
not work without a lot of blood on the floor, and it enables the global
environmentalists to have on hold the alliances with protectionists that
may turn out to be difficult to defeat, particularly when the party that is
proposing the legislation is a party which is, in significant part, allied
with organized labor and the protectionist wing.
The other way to do it, it seems to me, is to work with the environmental movement, to lay out in advance some parameters of what can
be gotten in the environmental portion of the agreements that are likely
to be negotiable internationally.
I think it is a very complicated subject. What is difficult for the
Latin American countries or any country we are dealing with, it seems
to me, is not the imposition on them of reasonable environmental criteria, particularly if it is put in the terms of goals and a given time frame
to achieve it. The problems are creating a mechanism for enforcement
and what can be done within the regional agreement against them if
they do not meet the goals. It seems to me this has to be worked out
with the environmental group beforehand; an understanding that they
will settle for less. They claim to be such globalists. We need political
pressure in the countries where the goals are not achieved as the major
means of getting what they want environmentally in foreign countries,
rather than having the United States impose some sanction authorized by
NAFTA or FTAA or whatever.
That would be what I would be pursuing. It seems to me that things
like that are things you have to think about to try and get that sort of
political issue behind you.
COMMENT, MR. EDWARDS: We do have an environmental section, I think, coming after this, so I do not want to take too much time,
particularly since you covered so many areas in your talk, which struck
so many different nerves. I did want to comment a little bit about the
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matter of social issues and their given nationalization. I include here
human rights as well as the environment.
I think the thing to bear in mind, first of all, is our long history of
internationalization. These are not issues that just recently emerged as
international. We have had migratory birds between Canada and the
United States. We have had polar bears. We have had a League for the
Conservation of Nature based in Switzerland for many, many years.
Henry King himself was a prosecutor at Nuremberg, and we ushered in
the human rights movement in the 1940s, and so forth. So this internationalization is nothing new.
I think what is new, and basically what has happened, is that those
who are concerned with the environment and human rights have looked
at ways that can get some leverage. Trade is one; the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one; and the World Bank is another. Some of these
institutions work it through themselves as to how they will deal with it,
such as the IMF and the World Bank. It seems to me in the trade area,
we need to do the same thing. We need to realize this is something, as
you suggested, that needs to be negotiated, rather than take the strong
doctrinary position.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR SHANKER: We have heard throughout
this evening how it is very difficult to work out treaty agreements with
partners who have different cultural systems or different legal systems.
One appreciates that, and I do not think it is news to those of us who
have been there. We have all known that. In fact, it is pretty tough
sometimes for me to work out a deal between Cleveland and Canton
people. Canton is a small town, sixty miles from Cleveland.
But you mentioned, and we have heard this before, that the Asiatic
people in particular have an approach that is very different from confrontation. They would prefer, instead, to negotiate relationships. I do
not think that is really foreign to a Western business person. I think,
despite the fact we are much more litigious in the round numbers, overwhelmingly, trade people, even within this context, would prefer to
develop relationships, to avoid confrontation, to try to work it out amicably. There are now formal institutions to help you, such as Alternate
Dispute Resolution (ADR). When push comes to shove, when all of this
fails, what happens? What happens in the Asian countries when, despite
all of the attempts to resolve and avoid the controversy, it is not resolved? Can anyone be a trading partner with anybody else anywhere in
the world if there is not some mechanism where, eventually, there is a
dispute-solving mechanism that becomes binding?
ANSWER, MR. CUNNINGHAM: I would say, first of all, that I
would agree that businessmen are much more able to deal with the
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Asian approach to issues than governments are, at least in the U.S.
government. The U.S. government is not alone on that. The European
Union is worse than we are in most of those confrontations.
In answer to your question as to what you do when you have the
problem, you have the market access barrier, for example, and all else
fails, what do you do? It is a question that has historically bedeviled
U.SJJapanese relations. I have been in lots of market-access cases with
Japan, in which I have brought, for example, a Section 301 case for a
U.S. company that has been excluded from the Japanese market by a
very clear violative practice. It is very clear that it is unfair. The Japanese will, in more cases than not in my experience, say, okay, you
should be retaliating against us. We would rather have you retaliate
against us than open up our market. Politically, it is easier for us that
way, and it is less disruptive to our idea of economic and social order
in Japan. Think about that for just a moment. You are in the piano
industry, for example, and you have been excluded from selling pianos
in Japan because Japanese pianos have to have different designs because
Japanese fingernails are different than American fingernails, or something like that. That is not irrational - skis could not be sold in Japan
because Japanese snow is different. Everybody knows that.
Retaliation is acknowledged and is undertaken against Japan, and we
limit imports of Japanese snowmobiles into the United States. What does
that do for you and your pianos? Nothing.
In market access, unlike the import problem cases that I and several
of you here have dealt with in steel, for example, over the years, the
name of the game has to be to get the other side to agree. If the other
side does not agree, unless there happens to be two-way trade in the
same product, which normally is not the case, failure to get the
agreement to open up the market means you lose. Retaliation means you
have lost. It may mean that you get some emotional satisfaction when
you hit those SOBs, but you have lost.
QUESTION, PROFESSOR SHANKER: I have a follow-up question.
Sure, you limit yourself to getting access in the first place. But suppose
you had gotten the access and it arises. I have sold my pianos to China
or Burma, whatever it might be, and we are in dispute now as to
whether I should be paid whether the pianos work or do not work.
Unless you have some dispute-resolving mechanism, how can you trade
like that?
ANSWER, MR. CUNNINGHAM: You have to have a way to get
the remedy. If you do not have a way to get a remedy, how can anybody in the world resolve the dispute? If everybody says Japan or Thailand or Singapore is wrong, or Bolivia is wrong, and the United States
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is entitled to retaliate against them; if that is all you can get out of it,
you have not gotten anything. And normally in the trade regime, that is
what you get in a dispute unless you can get an agreed resolution, and
that is where the problem lies.
COMMENT, PROFESSOR SHANKER: Sounds intractable. By the
way, Japanese cars, I know from a rather tall person, taller than I, are
not made for Americans, because their cars are made for smaller Japanese people. The poor tall Americans ....
COMMENT, MR. CUNNINGHAM: I have Investor Barchefsky's
number here for you.

